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2005; Frenda et al. 2011). Conversely, the Deese–Roediger–
McDermott illusion increases linearly from childhood to older
adulthood (e.g., Brainerd et al. 2008; Gallo 2010). How might
these different data patterns relate to the core versus attributional
systems in the integrative memory model? We welcome Bastin
et al.’s insights on how developmental patterns in false memory
illusions might constrain or validate their model. Indeed, we feel
it would be informative to consider the development of recollection
and familiarity processes for both true and false memories.
In sum, Bastin et al. should justify the integrative memory
model’s substantial complexity by addressing how that complexity
contributes to our understanding of (1) different types of false
memory phenomena (particularly false recollection), and (2)
the development of recollection and familiarity for true and
false memories across the lifespan. By incorporating these missing
elements, we feel the integrative memory model would be more
integrative and thus better live up to its name.
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Abstract
Although Bastin et al. propose a useful model for thinking about
the structure of memory and memory deficits, their distinction
between entities and relational encoding is incompatible with
data showing that even individual objects – prototypical “enti-
ties” – are made up of distinct features which require binding.
Thus, “entity” and “relational” brain regions may need to solve
fundamentally the same problems.
A fundamental tenet of the integrative memory model proposed by
Bastin et al. is the distinction between entity representation and rela-
tional representations. This distinction is based on the premise that
there is ameaningful sense of an “entity” that is holistic and unitized
and can be stored and retrieved without recollection or binding; for
example, Bastin et al.’s claim that at the “level of the perirhinal
cortex and anterolateral entorhinal all visual features are integrated
in a single complex representation of the object that can be discrim-
inated from other objects with overlapping features.”
It is natural to think that meaningful visual objects might be
unitized entities for visual memory, and indeed many memory
researchers take this claim for granted. However, we believe this
view of unitized, fully bound representation of objects is inconsis-
tent with the cognitive data on object memory. In particular,
supposed “entities” such as visual objects are not unitized repre-
sentations, but themselves are stored as separate features requiring
binding in the same fundamental way that objects need to be
bound to contexts. This calls into question the core distinction
between entities and relations proposed by the integrative
memory model and other similar models: If even single objects
are stored in a way consistent with the “relational system” –
where the “representation keeps components separate and flexibly
bound” (target article, sect. 4.1, para. 7) – then it is not clear what
an entity would be or whether the fundamental nature of the
brain regions subserving object memory are really distinct from
those subserving item-context integration.
Work from our labs shows that visual object features are stored
and accessed independently in long-term memory: Different
features of single individual objects are forgotten at different
rates (Brady et al. 2013); and people remember particular features
but don’t remember which objects these features belonged to
(Utochkin & Brady 2019). For example, if people are shown a
blue open backpack and then asked to choose among sets of
four backpacks that are blue/open, blue/closed, or red/open,
red/closed, people can forget the color but still can remember
its “open-ness” (Brady et al. 2013). Or, if people are shown one
mug (mug A) full of coffee and another mug (mug B) empty,
they are well above chance reporting that they saw one full mug
and one empty mug, and that they saw mug A and mug B, but
they are at chance at ascribing the “fullness” and “emptiness” to
the particular mugs A and B (Utochkin & Brady 2019).
Indeed, the idea that some items might be stored in a fully
unitized representation (in an “entity” system) seems incompati-
ble with the cognitive problem that object representations are
designed to solve. One of the central requirements of a visual
memory system is robustness to variation (Schurgin &
Flombaum 2018). If object representations were totally integrated
entities in memory, their recognition in the real world would be
extremely problematic, given the infinite number of poses and
states these objects can take, as well as variations in orientation,
lighting, and more. One might argue that this invariant recogni-
tion is possible if a unitized “concept” of a particular object is
formed during multiple episodes – connecting across multiple
experiences when an object is presented in different states and
viewpoints. But this claim immediately implies an independence
of the features forming the core of this concept and those repre-
senting the way it changes across contexts.
In contrast to any view based on unitized object memories, we
have demonstrated that people’s memories are extremely robust
to variation even at the level of individual objects, suggesting that
representations even at the level of objects are based on separate
features that are flexibly bound together rather than unitized. For
example, imagine you saw an open-doored cabinet, and then later
we asked which cabinet you had seen – but now the “old” item
was shown in a new state (the same cabinet now has its doors closed,
changing a huge number of visual features). We have shown that
people are nearly perfect at generalizing in this way, and can do
so even if the “foil” presented at test is a new open-doored cabinet,
designed to maximally mislead participants (Utochkin & Brady
2019). Therefore, we believe the flexible nature of binding attributed
by the integrative memory model only to item-context distinctions
and recollection situations, need to be extended to nearly every level
of representation of objects as well as contexts.
Similar evidence for independence and structured representa-
tion rather than unitized objects is present in the visual working
memory literature, where it is frequently found that both objects
and separate features can be stored and objects are not stored as
single integrated units (see Brady et al. 2011 for review). Since
working memory is critical for consolidation into long-term
memory, this may be the beginning of the non-unitized, non-
integral storage of items in memory.
Commentary/Bastin et al.: An integrative memory model of recollection and familiarity to understand memory deficits 19
https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X19000621
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Access paid by the UC San Diego Library, on 03 Jan 2020 at 19:12:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
Overall, we believe that entities are stored in a way that is not
holistic or unitized – and thus, at nearly every level of representa-
tion, there is a need for flexible, relational encoding. If this is a
common property of memories for individual objects (which is
associated with “entities”) and complex episodes (requiring the
involvement of “relational representations”), then is there a funda-
mental difference in the representation of these two kinds of
information, as proposed by the authors? If there is, then how
does one know where an entity ends and a relational representa-
tion begins? We believe our work and that of the rest of the visual
memory community is more consistent with the idea that there
is a hierarchy of representations, each requiring the storage of
relational information and each allowing for the possibility of
misbinding and other retrieval failures. Thus, rather than a strong
dichotomy between entities and relational storage, the benefits of
flexible, independent storage, and the resulting problem of bind-
ing features together, occur at every level of the hierarchy – from
the simplest visual feature conjunctions to the binding of objects
into contexts and into events.
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Abstract
Despite highlighting the role of the attribution system and pro-
posing a coherent large-scale architecture of declarative memory,
the integrative memory model would be more “integrative” if the
temporal dynamics of the interactions between its components
was clarified. This is necessary to make predictions in patients
with brain injury and hypothesize dissociations.
“Integrative” is a major asset and is highly relevant to qualify the
model presented by Bastin et al. in the target article. Integration is
inseparable from multimodality and multidimensionality: the
integrative memory model postulates that the systems processing
representations, relations, and attributions are linked inside a
coherent “architecture” allowing emergent properties. Within
this context, one of the major advances proposed by the integra-
tive memory model is the integration and the clarification of the
role of the attribution system, which is thought to depend mostly
on the prefrontal cortex. In contrast, most previous models of
memory were centered on the temporal lobes and Papez circuit.
Some of the aspects of the temporal dynamics of memory that
are currently not fully described in the model are: time perception
during memory (Eichenbaum 2017a); time sequences that
distinguish temporally distinct episodes and stimuli (Ekstrom &
Ranganath 2018; Ranganath & Hsieh 2016); projection in the
future (Addis & Schacter 2012); and the time scale for building
memories at the cellular level (Kukushkin & Carew 2017).
However, in this commentary we want to focus on another aspect
of temporal dynamics that is essential to clarify the architecture of
the integrative memory model. Because the integrative memory
model, as its name implies, integrates different components, it
is crucial to specify what kind of relation they entertain. This
information is missing from the present model. The authors
have devoted a large portion of the target article to describing
the general architecture of the components, leaving little space
to discuss exactly how they relate. (We think that their model
could have been dubbed the interaction memory model just as
well as the integrative memory model.)
Yet, although not fully specified, the integrative memory
model is already based on a few assumptions regarding its tempo-
ral dynamics. For example, in line with many previous studies,
familiarity is supposed to be rapid. The model also assumes
that memory “emerges from hierarchically organized representa-
tions distributed throughout the brain” (target article, sect. 5.3,
para. 1; emphasis added), which suggests a precise order in
which the different components are activated. In contrast, most
arrows connecting the different components of the model are
bidirectional, perhaps due to the lack of knowledge about the con-
nectivity between the components. However, the very presence of
these arrows suggests structural and functional connections that
have to be characterized.
Using behavioral reaction times for various memory tasks, it is
possible to get an idea of the latency of the activation of some of
these systems and such latencies can be used as upper time con-
straints. For example, behavioral paradigms based on time con-
straints can be used to precisely assess the speed of familiarity
(Besson et al. 2012). Recording brain activity using surface EEG
(electroencephalography) or MEG (magnetoencephalography),
possibly with source reconstruction, or combined EEG-fMRI (func-
tional magnetic resonance imaging) recordings (Hoppstädter et al.
2015) provides a more refined idea of the activation latencies of
each component of the model. Intracranial EEG is spatially more
precise and reveals, for example, a striking delay between the activity
of the perirhinal cortex and the hippocampus that should be taken
into account in models of memory (Barbeau et al. 2008; Trautner
et al. 2004). Methodological advances even allow comparison of
the neuronal activity of different medial temporal lobe regions
involved in memory (Mormann et al. 2008). Moreover, it is also
possible to calculate the strength of functional interactions between
brain regions, as well as causality and synchrony indices, using var-
ious approaches such as fMRI (Staresina et al. 2013), intracranial
EEG (Krieg et al. 2017; Kubota et al. 2013; Steinvorth et al. 2010),
and thorough analyses of neuronal activity (Staresina et al. 2019).
In parallel, validating these dynamics in clinical situations is
necessary. Alzheimer’s disease – inducing slowly increasing dam-
ages to many brain areas involved in both the representation and
attribution systems of the integrative memory model – is a perti-
nent example chosen by the authors. However, it is insufficient to
test the model’s dynamics. Experiential memory phenomena such
as déjà-vu (an erroneous feeling of familiarity) or reminiscences
(memories including a mental content and recollection) allow
testing of the model on another time scale (Curot et al. 2017).
These phenomena are highly transient – hundreds of milliseconds
to a few seconds. This is the real-time scale of familiarity feelings,
recollection, ecphory, and mental imagery. They become all the
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